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INTRODUCTION
In December of 2020, veteran journalist Joseph Epstein penned an “open letter” to Jill Biden, discouraging
her from using the honorific “doctor” despite her academic credentials. With perhaps incomplete sincerity,
Epstein suggested that “no one should call himself ‘Dr.’ unless he has delivered a child.” This fomented a
brief national discussion on the use of the title, the differences between academic and professional
doctorates, and the extent to which honorifics figure in systemic sexism or other objectionable social
interactions. For health care providers, the conversation was anything but novel. The question of who to
call “doctor” has elicited multiple statements of policy from the American Osteopathic Association ([AOA],
2020) and the American Medical Association ([AMA], 2021), as well as statutory regulation in several
jurisdictions; in American medical practice, at least, the question is evergreen.
This is partly because the interests at stake are so diverse, though some are weightier than others.
Patients have an interest in receiving clear, complete information about the training and competencies of
health care providers on whom they rely. Holders of doctoral degrees have an interest in having their
accomplishments and expertise appropriately recognized. Speakers of the English language have an
interest against being subject to misleading advertising—and against excessive regulatory interference
with idiomatic dialogue. People who lack doctoral credentials have an interest in not being made to feel
unheard or unimportant as a result. Unfortunately, most analysis of the issue narrows the context or omits
important interests from consideration, for example by primarily emphasizing the importance of
competent nurses or the stratifying influence of social honorifics.
The desire to keep the issue small is understandable, insofar as use of the doctoral honorific is a
relatively low-stakes concern—especially in medical ethics, where disagreement is often literally a matter
of life and death. Most attention paid to the doctoral honorific turns on intuitions about pretentious or
arrogant behavior, humorous bits about Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.s) responding to medical emergencies
or appeals to journalists specializing in manners and propriety. This is probably adequate when wondering
how to introduce oneself at social gatherings, or whether to use “Dr.” or “Mrs.” when addressing a wedding
invitation or thank-you card. But the role of the doctoral honorific in clinical settings is rather weightier. In
recent years, the AMA and AOA have taken steps to permit Doctor of Nursing Practice (D.N.P.s) to identify
themselves as “doctors” to patients, so long as they clarify, somehow, that they are not doctors of medicine
but of nursing. Unfortunately, such clarifications have met with limited success. If care providers are serious
about eliminating patient confusion—and they should be—then a careful balancing of interests will show
that the title of “doctor” should not be extended to non- physicians in ad hoc ways (as regulatory bodies
have begun to do) but avoided altogether in the context of patient care. Professional and governmental
regulatory bodies are likely not capable of decoupling “doctor” from “medical provider” in idiomatic
English. However, the elimination of the doctoral honorific from patient care contexts should reduce
patient confusion without objectionably undermining the interest that doctors (all kinds) have in seeing
their accomplishments and expertise appropriately recognized.
Because many readers will find our proposal radical, we want to be clear from the outset just what
it is that we are—and are not—claiming. Our narrow position is that qualified extension of the doctoral
honorific to D.N.P.s and similar in clinical settings is a step in the wrong direction, increasing rather than
decreasing extant confusion over the title. Our proposed solution is that D.N.P.s should not use the doctoral
honorific in patient interactions—but also that physicians, that is, appropriately licensed Doctor of Medicine
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(M.D.s) and Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine (D.O.s), should similarly refrain. Given the prevalence of
idiomatic understanding, we do not argue for total deregulation of the doctoral honorific; in contexts of
medical care, including advertising for health services, regulatory limitations on use of the title remain
appropriate. In non-treatment settings, from staff meetings to conferences to social gatherings, we
advocate respectful reliance on the doctoral honorific regardless of a person’s training pathway. But in the
context of clinical care, the medical profession already has numerous training pathway titles on which to
rely when communicating with patients. In particular, physicians—already defined by the AMA and AOA—
can appropriately and clearly differentiate themselves from clinicians on other training pathways through
stable reliance on their specific, rather than general, appellation.

AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF THE DOCTORAL HONORIFIC
The title of “doctor” originally applied to teachers. In Latin, docēre means “to teach,” and academic
doctorates were, at their inception, “a license to teach and nothing more” (Van Scoyoc, 1962, p.322). As
licentia docendi evolved into something more, so too did universities and the doctors working within them.
Thus, by the time William Tyndale produced his 16th century translation of the Holy Bible—the first English
edition of that work—he rendered the Greek nomodidaskaloi as “docturs of lawe” (Luke 5:17). Today,
translation software is more likely to identify didaskaloi as “teachers,” but in Tyndale’s day the agentive
noun connoted demonstration, making “doctor” the better word for pedagogy of a more theoretical sort.
By the 17th century, William Shakespeare was making liberal use of “doctor” to identify physicians, but as
academics may note when their claim to the doctoral honorific is challenged, at that time the study of
medicine was still dominated by Hippocrates’ four humors. By contrast, Gottfried Leibniz took a Doctorate
in Law from the University of Altdorf in 1666 and independently invented calculus in 1675.
English-speaking academics and physicians have on occasion stopped styling themselves “doctor,”
for example amidst a 19th century explosion in the use of the (then, unregulated) title by charlatans—that
is, “quacks” (A Man of the World, 1889, p.124). Thence, attempts to regulate or deregulate the doctoral
honorific became perennial, as institutions of higher education, medicine, and journalism wrangled with
popular perception and propriety. The title of “doctor” was historically a signal that its bearer possessed
sufficient expertise to helpfully instruct others on complex matters—like mathematics, medicine, or
morality. But because expertise in many contexts also engenders social status, the unscrupulous can
arrogate social status by simply adopting the title or, in other words, by faking the signal. When fake signals
become sufficiently widespread, the authentic signal loses its value. This gives doctors two separate, but
related, reasons to be protective of the doctoral honorific. One of these is essentially selfish: if the doctoral
honorific stops conferring social status, it is of less value to both authentic and inauthentic bearers. The
other, however, is a matter of public good. When the doctoral honorific fails to reliably track bearer
expertise, people who need to consult an expert must rely on alternative identifying signals. This explains
why academics and physicians eschew the doctoral honorific in times when it proliferates: by clarifying their
exact credentials (for example, via post-nominals) and shedding the doctoral honorific, experts can
distinguish themselves from charlatans while continuing to signal their expertise to the public.
The late 20th and early 21st century has witnessed a new proliferation of the doctoral honorific—
but instead of pretentious charlatans, this latest proliferation owes its genesis to explosive growth in higher
education. Initially, the regulatory efforts of the late 19th and early 20th century held sway, for example
with lawyers holding Juris Doctor (J.D.) degrees proscribed from using the title “doctor” either
“professionally or socially” (American Bar Association, 1968, p.657). These proscriptions did not last, though
it is still unfashionable in most contexts for lawyers to style themselves “doctor.” In many jurisdictions, all
that remains of the original proscription today is the admonishment that lawyers must avoid client
confusion. Meanwhile, between 2000 and 2018, the number of Americans holding doctoral degrees more
than doubled, from about 2 million to over 4.5 million (America Counts Staff, 2019). In addition to J.D.s, a
host of D.N.P.s, Doctor of Education (Ed.D.s), Doctor of Physical Therapy (D.P.T.s), and others have swelled
the ranks of American “doctors” who are not physicians, theologians, or research academics. While
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individuals holding such degrees may be personally ambivalent about the doctoral honorific, program
advocates tend to emphasize “equivalence” with other training endeavors, as well as highlighting the per
se importance of advanced study in their respective fields. Because many of these programs
disproportionately attract female students, efforts to proscribe use of the doctoral honorific have also been
met with accusations of sexism— prompting some journalists to update their style guides in favor of
applying the doctoral honorific to non-physicians (Ryan, 2018).

THE INTERESTS AND ETHICS OF HONORIFICS
We take no position on the cultural propriety of the doctoral honorific; style, manners, and aesthetics are
not our concern. But in some contexts, the use or proscription of the doctoral honorific bears ethical
implications. Specifically, we think that behavior is morally permissible when it does not violate a principle
“for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced
general agreement” (Scanlon, 1998, p.153). This approach to gauging permissibility is known as
contractualism. The “ideal to which contractualism appeals” is “that of being able to justify your actions to
others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject” (Scanlon, 1998, p.154). Principles that cannot be
reasonably rejected are informally identified by weighing the costs they impose on the interest’s people
have, against the costs imposed by alternative principles (Scanlon, 1982). Moral theorists writing on
bioethics are often concerned with extremely important interests, like the interests we all have in staying
alive, being healthy, and living autonomously. Where important interests are at stake, the range of morally
permissible actions can be quite narrow; principles imposing costs measured in life or liberty must be
justified by even weightier interests, or else rejected.
Use of the doctoral honorific is not, we think, an especially weighty matter. Indeed, to many,
honorifics are trivial at best, and insisting on a certain “correct” pattern of usage can come across as
exceptionally vain. Conversely, refusing to adopt such patterns can seem pointlessly disrespectful—even
bigoted. But whether a pattern of speech is idiomatic, polite, or fashionable has little bearing on whether it
is morally permissible. It would be tacky, even impolite, to address a wedding announcement to your
physician friend, “Ms. India Johnson.” Would it be morally blameworthy? This depends a lot on the details
of your relationship with Dr. Johnson, because those details are relevant to the justification you will be able
to offer, and the sorts of justification she could not reasonably reject. This also applies to Dr. Johnsons’
eventual response—or, indeed, anyone else’s. Even if we assume that mistitling Dr. Johnson is morally
blameworthy, it seems unlikely that the AMA could permissibly levy a fine against you for the insult.
Contractualism is not concerned with identifying what is optimal, morally, or otherwise. The question with
which we are concerned is whether and when, ethically speaking, the doctoral honorific can or must be
regulated. To answer that question, we must consider the interests at stake.
Everyone has an interest in being addressed respectfully by others, but we also have autonomy
interests against being punished for speaking our minds. Our interest in expressing ourselves freely is often
regarded as sufficiently important to be recognized as a fundamental right—in the United States, enshrined
in the First Amendment to the Constitution. Even our important interests are, however, defeasible;
impositions on the way we speak can be justified when yet-weightier interests are at stake. American courts
have recognized several such interests, permitting government-sponsored regulation of speech including
incitement to violence, obscenity, and—of particular relevance to the present inquiry—commercial speech.
Regulation on the advertisement of medical products and services is today commonplace, and closely
related to the requirements of education and licensure imposed on clinicians of various kinds. The usual
justification for such paternalistic regulation is that people have an important interest in receiving
competent care but are often poorly positioned to personally identify competent clinicians. Regulation of
the doctoral honorific has long been one small piece of a larger regulatory scheme aimed at empowering
the public to confidently rely on the expertise of medical care providers. Thus, for the better part of the 20th
century, non-physicians in health care contexts were forbidden by regulatory bodies from identifying
themselves as “doctors,” even when they held doctoral degrees. The interest non-physician doctors have
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in recognition of their expertise was not regarded as sufficiently weighty to underwrite rejection of a
patient-protecting principle forbidding non-physicians from identifying to patients as “doctor.”
What changed? We think two historical developments underpin 21st century shifts in attitude
toward the doctoral honorific. The first is growing social recognition of the interest individual women have
in their expertise not being dismissed by virtue of their sex. The second is the proliferation of doctoral
degrees in the early 21st century—a phenomenon overwhelmingly driven by women (Perry, 2020).
Previously, insisting on one’s doctoral title was often cast as pretentious; the primary interest being
weighed was a legitimate but, ultimately, self-serving desire for recognition of one’s personal
accomplishments. When it was recognized that men tend to dispense with formal titles when introducing
women in professional settings, but not vice versa, and noted that this might unfairly disadvantage women,
insisting on one’s title came to be recognized as a response to potentially discriminatory behavior (Files et
al., 2017). Since we all have an important interest in living in a society where our sex (or race, or religion, or
similar) is not regarded as contraindicating expertise, principles forbidding doctorate holders from use of
the doctoral honorific fell under new suspicion. Perhaps such principles could be reasonably rejected after
all, as hampering the ability of some to be recognized as equals in professional contexts.
But if our normative gloss on recent trends is a good fit, it raises a question: does a principle
permitting DNPs or other non-physicians to identify themselves to patients as “doctor” adequately account
for the interest patients have against being misled? In contexts like academic conferences, staff meetings,
or social gatherings, a principle forbidding holders of doctoral degrees from identifying as doctors can, it
seems, be reasonably rejected; the interest in having one’s expertise appropriately recognized, regardless
of sex, does not appear to be outweighed by any competing interests in those contexts. Whether one holds
a Ph.D., Ed.D., M.D., D.N.P., or even a J.D., the doctoral honorific can be appropriately and ethically applied
in non-clinical contexts, even if some people do find it pretentious or embarrassing. But the context of
medical treatment is different. There, patients are much more likely to rely on an idiomatic interpretation
of the doctoral honorific—that is, most people think “doctor” means “physician,” even when attempts are
made to explain the difference. For most people, the history and nuance of the doctoral honorific will be
uninteresting and attempts to educate them may be confusing—or unwelcome. Patients seeking
competent medical attention are overwhelmingly likely to have weightier matters on their minds.
While the revised policies of the AMA and AOA pay lip service to permitting broader use of the
doctoral honorific while avoiding patient confusion through clarificatory disclaimers, empirical evidence
suggests that confusion persists. In one recent survey, 39% of respondents believed that a DNP qualified as
a “physician,” with another 11% uncertain—only half clearly understood DNPs to not be physicians (AMA,
2018). Indeed, role-title confusion concerning DNPs persists not only among the general public, but among
medical care providers (Uldis & Mancuso). Given the extent to which the public was already confused about
the “kind of care . . . [physician’s assistants (PAs) and nurse practitioners (N.P.s)] are able to deliver in
comparison to the more widely understood physician profession” (Parrault & Hildebrand, 2018, p.1857), it
may simply be asking too much for a significant number of patients to meaningfully grasp the nuance of
“Doctor Nurse.” If a patient’s autonomy interest against being misled is weightier than a clinician’s respect
interest in being called “doctor”—and we think that it is—then patients can reasonably reject a principle
allowing non-physicians to identify themselves as “doctors” in a treatment setting, even if they also clarify
their clinical role. While clinicians all have an interest in appropriate recognition of their expertise, there are
other ways to make one’s expertise known than by insisting on the use of a potentially confusing title.
Contrary to recent trends in policy- making, regulatory bodies should not permit the use of the doctoral
honorific by non-physicians in treatment contexts.
This is not, however, the only implication borne by a balancing of interests between patients and
providers. Given the generic nature of the doctoral honorific and its recent proliferation, patients also
cannot be appropriately regarded as fully informed by a physician’s reliance on the doctoral honorific.
Empirically, more than one in ten respondents to an AMA survey either did not think that, or were unsure
whether, surgeons, obstetricians, and primary care physicians qualified as “physicians.” Another recent poll
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showed that patients rely with alarming frequency on the wearing of stethoscopes and the color of scrubs
to clue them in to their clinician’s level of expertise (American College of Emergency Physicians, 2021).
Meanwhile, a physician’s own claim to the doctoral honorific, while idiomatic, is grounded in the
same personal interest in recognition of expertise held by every other doctoral professional. While idiomatic
English makes patient confusion less of a concern for physicians using the doctoral honorific in treatment
contexts, some confusion persists, and doctoral professionals like DNPs still have a fairness interest in not
having their expertise disregarded in contexts where physician expertise is acknowledged. Thus, in
treatment contexts where non-physicians are obligated to refrain from use of the doctoral honorific,
physicians should likewise refrain.

ROLES AND HONORIFICS IN OTHER TIMES AND PLACES
While our proposed solution obviously challenges the status quo—for physicians and other doctoral
clinicians alike, given recent trends in policy-making—we think it better aligns with broader trends in history
and language. As observed in Section 1, there is historical precedent for physicians eschewing the doctoral
honorific when it proliferates, so as to preserve public trust in the profession. The 21st century explosion in
duly granted doctoral degrees is a different kind of problem than the 19th century explosion in quackery,
but its relevance to the practice of medicine is essentially the same: increased numbers of non-physician
doctors mean physicians need a finer-grained approach to public messaging. By clearly communicating
roles and clinical training pathways rather than relying on generic honorifics like “doctor,” providers
appropriately recognize the patient interest against being misled. This may even be less of a departure from
the status quo than it might initially seem; regulatory bodies have already promulgated numerous titling
guidelines in connection with roles like “physician’s assistant” and “nurse practitioner” (though it would
likely be of additional help to patients if care providers did not routinely abbreviate their role to an alphabet
soup of postnominals). The word “physician” itself is already clearly reserved by the AMA and AOA to
licensed M.D.s and D.O.s. Physicians in treatment settings already have good reason to identify themselves
as physicians, then, since identifying as “doctor” under current rules no longer clearly distinguishes them
from D.N.P.s or other non-physicians with doctoral degrees.
The extent to which confusion or clarity can result from the relationship between titles and roles
can also be seen when looking abroad. In the United Kingdom, for example, the doctoral honorific is but
inconsistently regulated—though there is a long-running argument, stemming from the deprecated role of
“barber surgeon,” over the tradition of referring to surgeons as “mister,” “missus,” or even “miss”
(Laurance, 2005). The standard degree for physicians in the UK is the Bachelor of Medicine (M.B.) degree,
affording its holders the doctoral honorific based on role rather than title—while surgeons, who typically
begin with an M.B. degree and then secure additional training and certification, essentially shed the
doctoral honorific. The recent rebellion of surgeons against this historic norm tracks nicely with our
concerns about reducing patient confusion and appropriately recognizing physician expertise, though (like
American physicians) physicians in the UK would be well-served to avoid the doctoral honorific entirely in
treatment contexts.
To consider a less anglophone example: in Germany, where many honorifics are strictly regulated,
the title of “Doktor” is afforded to academics who complete a research thesis within the European Union.
Physicians who complete the “Dr. med” degree alone are referred to as Arzt or Ärztin—a “physician” who is
afforded no particular honorific beyond the “Mr.” and “Mrs.” equivalents Herr and Frau. But “Doktor” is also
employed idiomatically as a noun referring to the clinical practitioner with a medical doctorate. Patients
often address their physician as “Herr Doktor” (which would revert to “Herr Müller” if the patient is of
comparable academic rank). Completion of additional academic theses accrues additional titles, so
colleagues might respectfully refer to a physician with dual theses as “Herr Doktor Doktor Müller,” while
patients would address the same physician simply as “Herr Doktor” (Schneider, 2016). While Germans do
not universally regard this as an improvement over the British system (Groneberg, 2001), we think that the
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separation between modes of address from colleagues versus patients partially instantiates the approach
for which we advocate here.
These examples help to illustrate the relative ubiquity of the challenge—and the workability of our
proposed response. We do not think that medical professionals need to engage in a robust campaign of
linguistic reform; indeed, we are skeptical that such a thing would be either wise or practicable. Rather, we
think extant debate over the doctoral honorific has generated counterproductive responses from
regulatory bodies, imposing objectionable costs on patient interests by extending the doctoral honorific to
non-physicians. We further believe that a solution may be found in history and linguistic tradition, through
increased reliance on role- focused titles in treatment settings. The doctoral honorific has never been the
sole province of physicians, and so should be liberally afforded to doctorate holders in social and
professional settings—but should be eschewed entirely in treatment contexts. Physicians should introduce
themselves to their patients as physicians.

CONCLUSION
In clinical settings, most patient care can be competently handled by mid-level practitioners, non-physician
providers, or advanced care providers. But some pathologies require significant exposure and diagnostic
acumen, only acquired after thousands of clinical hours. No wonder, then, that most people who seek
medical care prefer to be attended by a physician (Leach et al., 2018). This creates a conundrum for a nation
anticipating a shortfall of 139,000 physicians in the next 12 years (Boyle, 2020). If most patients prefer to
see a physician, but there aren’t enough physicians to go around, then some people are not going to get
what they prefer. If a qualified DNP, in the course of providing competent care, were asked to send in a “real
doctor,” it would be understandably tempting to retort, “I am a real doctor!” Capitalizing on patient
confusion to reduce their dissatisfaction while nevertheless providing them with the care they need is
fundamentally paternalistic. While we do not think paternalism is always wrong, it must be justified by a
weightier interest than the patient’s interest against being misled. We do not think that a nurse’s legitimate
interest in being suitably respected by his or her patients is generally sufficiently weighty in this regard.
Patients should be told when they are not being seen by a physician, even if this reduces patient satisfaction
with substantively adequate care.
This is in part because the cost of patient deception, while often minimal, can at times be quite
significant. A case related by physician Niran Al-Agba (2017) illustrates the point. A new mother was
referred to a pediatric specialist, Dr. Jones. She expressed concerns about her baby’s heart health, but Dr.
Jones insisted that there was nothing wrong with the child’s heart. When the child failed to gain weight, Dr.
Jones ultimately referred the mother to Child Protective Services for neglect. While interactions with Child
Protective Services can be shockingly fraught, the bureaucrat assigned to this case started by
recommending the mother seek a second medical opinion—which identified a heart murmur and led to the
eventual diagnosis of two septal defects and Total Anomalous Pulmonary Venous Return. The pediatrician
who made the correct diagnosis was a physician; Dr. Jones, by contrast, was a D.N.P. Even assuming Dr.
Jones clearly posted his credentials, honestly explained his training pathway, and never willfully
misrepresented himself, the mother in this case trusted his expertise as a pediatric doctor. Until Child
Protective Services got involved, it had apparently never occurred to the mother to seek a more qualified
authority—suggesting that she either did not understand the difference between a DNP and a physician or
did not understand that her baby’s “doctor” was a D.N.P.
Anecdotes along these lines are commonplace among physicians; patient confusion is a hard and
persistent problem. But forbidding D.N.P.s or other non-physician doctors from employing the doctoral
honorific—as was the standard for most of the 20th century—only partially addresses the interests at stake.
To achieve maximum clarity, the misleading doctoral honorific will need to be discarded in all patient
interactions. Patients have the right to receive medical care, and to refuse medical care. One may refuse
medical care based upon knowledge of who the care provider will be. Obfuscation of clinical roles only
makes patient rights more challenging to appropriately ensure. The best way to orchestrate patient rights
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is to refer to all practitioners—physicians, physician’s assistants, nurse practitioners, and so forth—by their
appropriate clinical title. One would not refer to BSN-trained nurses as “bachelors,” or health
administrators as “masters.” It is time for physicians to follow suit and relinquish the doctoral honorific in
contexts of care.
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